SFLASH was chosen as one of the final selection of the NESSIE project in 2003. It is one of the most efficient digital signature scheme and is suitable for implementation on memory-constrained devices such as smartcards. Side channel attacks (SCA) are a serious threat to memory-constrained devices. If the implementation on them is careless, the secret key may be revealed. In this paper, we experimentally analyze the effectiveness of a side channel attack on SFLASH. There are two different secret keys for SFLASH, namely the proper secret key (s, t) and the random seed ∆ used for the hash function SHA-1. Whereas many papers discussed the security of (s, t), little is known about that of ∆. Steinwandt et al. proposed a theoretical DPA for finding ∆ by observing the XOR operations. We propose another DPA on ∆ using the addition operation modulo 2 32 , and present an experimental result of the DPA. After obtaining the secret key ∆, the underlying problem of SFLASH can be reduced to the C * problem broken by Patarin. From our simulation, about 1408 pairs of messages and signatures are needed to break SFLASH. Consequently, SHA-1 must be carefully implemented in order to resist SCA on SFLASH * . key words: asymmetric signature, SFLASH, side channel attacks, SHA-1, C * , C * −− , hidden monomial problem
Introduction
In order to achieve higher security, secret keys are usually stored on tamper-resistant smartcards. However, side channel attacks (SCA) enable to break the secret key on them, if their implementation is careless. We have to carefully treat with SCA. SFLASH is an efficient digital signature scheme suitable for the implementation on smartcards. Akkar et al. reported that its signature generation requires only 60 ms on an Infineon SLE 66 [1] . In the frame of the NESSIE project, SFLASH was chosen in the final selection of cryptographic algorithms [15] .
The security of SFLASH is based on the C * −− problem, which is a modification of the C * problem (some public quadratic equations are hidden) [3] , [17] . Patarin proposed an attack to break the C * problem by means of linear algebra techniques [16] . The signature function of SFLASH is a map (F 2 7 ) 37 → (F 2 7 ) 37 which uses the secret keys (∆, s, t) and comprises (1)computing the hash value of a message with the secret key ∆ (Note that the first 27 elements of F 2 7 depend only on the message), (2) generating the signature of the message with the other secret keys (s, t). In order to forge a signature, we need to compute step (2) without the knowledge of the secret keys (s, t), namely we have to solve the C * −− problem. On the contrary, step (1) deals only with the secret key ∆ and is therefore independent from the C * −− problem. If the secret key ∆ is broken, then step (2) is not secure, in other words, the C * −− problem is reduced to the C * problem. The security of ∆ is strongly depending on the structure of SHA-1. Steinwandt et al. [21] described a side channel attack on SHA-1 in SFLASH. also described a side channel attack on SHA-1 in the RSAES-OAEP [18] , and their attacks are applicable to the SHA-1 portion of SFLASH. These attacks allow to recover the secret key ∆ by analyzing XOR operations of SHA-1.
In this paper, we demonstrate the first experimental results about a complete attack on SFLASH relying on side channel information leakage of the secret key ∆. We observe the side channel information arisen from the addition modulo 2 32 related to ∆ in SHA-1. About 200,000 samples from the signing oracle enable us to break the secret key ∆. Note that this number of oracle calls strongly depends on the computational environment, therefore it would not be unrealistic to foresee an attack requiring less oracle calls. Then, we implemented Patarin's algebraic attack on C * using the previous work of Patarin [16] and Koblitz [9] , and we constructed a dummy signature function without the knowledge of the secret keys (s, t). From our simulation, about 1408 pairs of messages and their signatures can generate the dummy signature function within a few hours. This algebraic attack can be achieved without asking the signing oracle-we can perform it totally off-line, only using the public key. If the C * problem is obtained, under realistic conditions, Patarin's attack makes it possible to forge a signature within a relatively short time. Therefore, once an attacker successfully breaks the secret key ∆, SFLASH is no longer secure. The protection of ∆ against side channel attacks is a critical security issue for SFLASH: the implementers of SFLASH have to carefully consider the implementation of SHA-1.
Hidden Monomial Cryptosystems
Hidden monomial cryptosystems were first introduced by Imai and Matsumoto in [14] . In [16] , Patarin broke the ImaiMatsumoto cryptosystem; soon after that, he proposed en-hanced versions which, he assumed, were able to resist his cryptanalysis, but most of them were broken, too. However, one of the variants of the Imai-Matsumoto cryptosystem remains: SFLASH.
In this section, we describe a simplified version of the cryptosystem introduced by Imai and Matsumoto, then show how Patarin's cryptanalysis can break it. Finally, the variants of the Imai-Matsumoto cryptosystem are shortly surveyed.
Imai-Matsumoto Cryptosystem
In [14] , Matsumoto and Imai presented a fast signature scheme based on the following property: two secret affine transformations are "blinded" by a non-linear monomial map. Since the affine transformations "hide" the monomial map, a general denomination for such cryptosystems is "hidden monomial."
In the case of the Imai-Matsumoto cryptosystem (IM), the two secret affine applications are s : K n → K n and t : K n → K n where K = F q and q is a power of two. Let L be an extension of degree n of the finite field K; then, given a basis β = (β 0 , . . . ,
The exponent h further satisfies gcd (h, q n − 1) = 1: in this case, F is a bijection and its inverse is
Given a message y = (y 0 , . . . , y n−1 ) ∈ K n , the signature is computed as follows:
Then, the signature y = (y 0 , . . . , y n−1 ) ∈ K n is valid if
G * is a quadratic map as F is. Therefore, G * can be written as: G * (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) = (y 0 , . . . , y n−1 ), where
The public verification function consists of the n quadratic equations P k .
Patarin's Cryptanalysis of C *
The straight-forward attack against IM is to find a map
If the attacker knows all of the n quadratic equations P i , that is, full dimensional G * (X), then the problem to find [
is known as the C * problem [14] . The straight-forward attack against the C * problem is to solve the quadratic system which consists of the n public equations P i . However, Patarin's cryptanalysis [16] demonstrated that breaking C * is not equivalent to solving a quadratic system over K n . His attack is classified into chosen message attacks: the attacker gathers enough pairs of messages and signatures by computing the verification function
we obtain the equation
by raising both sides of the first equation to the power q θ − 1 and multiplying them with A · B. That is, Eq. (5) is linear in both A and B. As a result, each pair of message and signature has an equation of the form
where γ j,k,l , δ j,l , j,l , η l are elements of K, and (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ), (y 0 , . . . , y n−1 ) respectively denote the input and the output of the function G * (X). These equations are linear in both sets of variables (x 0 , . . . , x n−1 ) and (y 0 , . . . , y n−1 ). An inputoutput pair provides a linear equation of the coefficients of γ j,k,l , δ j,l , j,l and η l . If a sufficient number of input-output pairs is gathered, the attacker can recover at most n linear independent equations of the form (6) [9] , [16] . From these equations, the attacker is able to construct a dummy signature function [G * ] −1 . Patarin's cryptanalysis is particularly efficient: breaking the C * problem becomes roughly equivalent to finding the kernel of an n 2 × (n + 1) 2 matrix in K.
Variants of IM
In [16] , Patarin broke IM with an attack involving linear algebra. Then, several variants which were assumed to be resistant against Patarin's cryptanalysis were proposed: among other Little Dragon and Big Dragon [17] . However, they were all broken, except FLASH [3] and its even faster variant SFLASH [19] .
SFLASH
In this section we review SFLASH [19] . We describe the specifications required for our attack and the currently known attacks are shortly surveyed. For detailed description of SFLASH, see [19] .
Specification of SFLASH
SFLASH is a variant of Imai-Matsumoto cryptosystem [14] , which was the first of hidden monomial cryptosystems. SFLASH particularly uses the following finite fields:
). In order to embed a message to the finite fields we utilize the following maps: π : {0, 1}
7 → K and ϕ : K 37 → L, where 11 are linear in L, F is a quadratic map of L. In addition to K, L, F, the hash function SHA-1 [20] is a system parameter.
SFLASH has three secret parameters: an 80-bit secret string ∆, and two affine secret bijections (s, t): K 37 → K 37 . The public key G of SFLASH is constructed as follows: G is a map of K 37 → K 26 , which is the restriction of the map In the following we describe the signing and verification algorithms of SFLASH; Figure 1 illustrates these algorithms with flow charts.
Signature Generation
The signature generation function SFLASH Signature computes a signature S for a given message M using the secret keys (∆, s, t) as follows:
Note that x||y denotes the concatenation of two strings x, y.
SFLASH Signature first computes the hash values (Y||R) using ∆ and then the signature [
* is regarded as a trapdoor one-way function in SFLASH. Note that the first hash value Y does not depend on the secret key ∆, but the second hash value R does. The 11 elements of K for input to [G * ] −1 are not public, so that the security is based on the C * −− problem [17] . The C * −− problem will be discussed in the next section.
Signature Verification
For a given message M and its signature S , we can verify the validity of the signature as follows: 
SFLASH Verification
Input: A message M, a signature S , a public parameter G Output: "valid" or "invalid"
The verification function of SFLASH does not require the secret information ∆, and only the first 26 elements of K are compared for checking the validity of a signature.
Known Attacks on SFLASH
SFLASH uses the public key G instead of G * . This means that r out of the 37 equations P i (i = 0, 1, . . . , 36) that belong to G * are hidden. Patarin et al. discussed that the problem to find [
is large enough [17] . This modified C * problem with large #K r is called C * −− problem according to [17] . The choice r = 11 of SFLASH is secure due to (2 7 ) r = 2 77 .
Geiselmann et al. discussed the security of (s, t), which is the affine part of the secret key [6] . Denote by s = (S L , S C ) and t = (T L , T C ) the linear transformation matrix and the constant vector of the affine bijective maps s, t : K 37 → K 37 , respectively. They showed that the constant vectors S C , T C ∈ K 37 do not really randomize the map G.
Gilbert and Minier presented an attack on the original version of SFLASH (we refer to it as SFLASHv1) [5] . The secret keys (s, t) of SFLASHv1 were chosen not in K 37 → K 37 but F 2 37 → F 2 37 . From this choice of (s, t), the hidden quadratic equations P i (i = 26, . . . , 36) can be represented as
where
This representation induces a tiny SFLASH problem which is defined over F 2 instead of K. This tiny SFLASH problem is not infeasible anymore and the attacker can recover the hidden polynomials P i (i = 26, . . . , 36). In other words, he/she can transform the C * −− problem into the C * problem. Patarin's cryptanalysis is now applicable to SFLASHv1. They showed that the complexity of finding these equations is reduced to less than 2 38 . The revised version of SFLASH (i.e. SFLASHv2) chooses (s, t) in the extension field K = F 2 7 .
Reducing
In the following, we assume that the secret key ∆ is known. Under this condition, we describe how SFLASH is vulnerable to Patarin's cryptanalysis [16] , which enables us to efficiently construct a dummy signature generation function.
Recall that SFLASH Signature generates a signature S for a given message M using the secret key ∆ and the publicly known hash function SHA-1. The algebraic part related to the C * −− problem is the function
where Y ∈ K 26 is depending only on the message M but R ∈ K 11 is additionally on ∆. Note that we know both Y and R from secret key ∆. Therefore, the attacker is able to obtain full input Y||R ∈ K 37 and output S ∈ K 37 . Next, a signature is a random element of
. . , x 36,k be randomly chosen signatures. We can compute the image of these signatures by the map G * using the public verification function G and ∆. We denote these images by y 0,k , . . . , y 36,k . Therefore the attacker can have pairs of whole input and output to [G * ] −1 , and the C * problem is obtained. Thus, we have proved the following claim:
Claim 1: Under the assumption that the secret key ∆ is known, the security of SFLASH is reduced from C * −− to C * .
Side Channel Attacks
In this section we review side channel attacks (SCA). In the attack model of SCA, the attacker is allowed to access the side-channel information linked to the operations involving the secret key, e.g., timings [10] , power consumptions [11] , etc. The attack aims at guessing the secret key (or some related information). If the attacker is allowed to observe the side channel information only a few times, it is called simple power analysis (SPA) . If the attacker can analyze several observations of the side channel information using a statistical tool, it is called differential power analysis (DPA). The standard DPA utilizes the correlation function that can distinguish whether a specific bit is related to the observed calculation. In particular, XOR operations between the secret key and temporary data are often utilized as a target. Akkar et al. proposed an efficient implementation of SFLASH, which is suitable for smartcards [1] . Implementation of cryptographic algorithms on memory-constrained environments is generally vulnerable to side channel attacks [10] , [11] . In order to resist side channel attacks, they show how to randomize the secret key (s, t) based on the homomorphic property of the function F −1 . On the other hand, Steinwandt et al. presented a theoretical DPA on the secret key ∆ by analyzing the operations of the hash function SHA-1 [21] . Klíma-Rosa also proposed another side channel attack against SHA-1 [8] in the RSAES-OAEP scheme [18] . These attacks utilize XOR operations for detecting the secret. We stress that these attacks are only theoretical works and are not confirmed experimentally. In fact, the assumptions of these attacks are controversial. We discuss these side channel attacks against SHA-1 in the following.
Side Channel Attacks against SHA-1
First we briefly review the hash function SHA-1. For a detailed description of SHA-1, see [20] . The algorithm of SHA-1 is as follows: 
The functions f t (x, y, z) are the following logical functions
The message M is padded at Step 1. First, M is divided into 512-bit words M 0 , . . . , M n−1 , and the remainder M n . The remainder M n is appended to 10 . . . 0 and the bitlength of the message M in order to be a 512-bit word. The
Step 4 to 7 is performed for each 512-bit word M i .
Side Channel Attacks on ∆: At Step 3 of SFLASH Signature, the message M = (V||∆) is inputted to SHA-1. Since the bit-length of the message is 262, the padded message M consists of one 512-bit word M 0 , namely M = M 0 . At
Step 4 of SHA-1, the 512-bit word M 0 is divided into sixteen 32-bit words W 0 , . . . , W 15 
Known Attacks against (a):
In respect of case (a), two attacks are known; the attack of Steinwandt et al. [21] and that of Klíma-Rosa [8] . These attacks utilize XOR operations for revealing the secret. Steinwandt et al. [21] showed that a DPA is applicable to these operations theoretically, and concluded that the secret key ∆ is completely revealed. The attack assumes that the result of XOR among three words and the target bit is randomly distributed. This seems to be true, however, in this situation many words are equal to 0x00000000 and XOR are performed not simultaneously but one after another in (a) † . This might become a cause of failure of the attack. Note that this might reduce the noise of the power consumption, however, the effectiveness of the attack must be confirmed through the experiment, and Steinwandt et al. [21] did not experiment.
On the other hand, Klíma-Rosa [8] proposed another side channel attack against the SHA-1 portion in the RSAES-OAEP scheme [18] . The attack is straightforwardly applicable to SHA-1 in SFLASH. The attacker utilizes the Hamming weight of W t for detecting the unknown word W t . This attack is also discussed theoretically. The attack assumes that the attacker can detect the Hamming weight of intermediate data using one single observation. However, this assumption is not realistic, since the power consumption is generally noisy, and the difference of power consumptions with different Hamming weights is below the signal-to-noise (S/N) ratio. In order to distinguish the difference, we often use the averaging technique, which reduces the noise and improves the S/N ratio. However, Klíma-Rosa [8] did not discuss the averaging technique. Even if the averaging technique is applied to their attack, SHA-1 must be feeded with the same data. This is a particular drawback of this attack. Not to mention, these are possible ways to detect the secret key ∆, but we stress that these methods were discussed theoretically and were not confirmed experimentally. In the next section, we propose a side channel attack against the operation (b); unlike the techniques described in [21] and [8] , the validity of our theoretical work was verified experimentally.
Proposed Attacks
In this section we propose a new attack against SFLASH. The proposed attack tries to construct a signature generation function with the help of side channel information.
Main Idea and Attack Model
We describe the main idea of the proposed attack. The proposed attack consists of a side channel attack on the secret parameter ∆ and an algebraic attack on the signature function SFLASH Signature. The goal of the proposed attack is to generate a new signature function which produces a valid signature for any given message. The proposed attack is a chosen message attack. At first the attacker gathers a lot of pairs (M i , S i ) along with the power consumption P i (side channel information) of SFLASH Signature. The attacker then proceeds as follows: † For example, Steinwandt's attack utilizes W 13 for revealing W 8 . However, W 13 is 0x00000000 because of the padding of SHA-1. In addition, the attack on W 8 is performed during the computation of W 16 ← (W 13 ⊕ W 8 ⊕ W 2 ⊕ W 0 ) ≪ 1. In fact, usual CPU cannot manipulate these XOR operations simultaneously. However, Steinwandt's attack uses only the input and output of this computation, and does not discuss how to implement and manipulate these operations. Since usual RAM is based on the capacitors, the power consumption depends on the data stored and whether it changes or not. If the manipulated data is always zero, the power consumption is not randomly distributed but biased in general. In other words, the order of the operations is also important for the success of the attack, however, Steinwandt's attack does not highlight such implementation issues.
Side Channel Attack on ∆: He/She tries to recover the secret key ∆ by analyzing the power consumption P i . We examined the operations related to ∆ for SHA-1, and pointed out the possible operations that are vulnerable to SCA. In Sect. 5.2, we will discuss the possibility of detecting ∆ using a side channel attack.
Algebraic Attack on Signature Function: In Sect. 3.3 we discussed that the knowledge of ∆ reduces the security of SFLASH to the C * problem. Thus, Patarin's attack allows us to construct a dummy signature function. We discuss the complete implementation of Patarin's attack and estimate the required number of signatures in Sect. 5.3.
Side Channel Attacks on ∆

Proposed Attack against (b):
We consider the case (b). Unfortunately, no attack against arithmetic operations exists at present. Note that countermeasures using arithmetic masks were proposed. On the one hand, logical operations such as XOR are computed bit-wise, and the target bit depends only on some specific bit in it. Thus, to construct an attack against logical operations is simple. On the other hand, an arithmetic operation is calculated using carries/borrows, and the target bit depends on several bits in it. Thus, to construct an attack against arithmetic operation is complicated.
We propose an attack against the arithmetic addition of (b , but he/she does not know whether his/her guess is correct or not. Thus, he/she needs to confirm whether the guess is correct or not, using side channel information.
He/she classifies the inputs (V||∆) into two categories; the j-th bit of TEMP2 is 0 or 1. Then he/she observes the power consumption for each input, and calculates the average power consumption for each category. The difference of these averages provides the information whether the attacker's guess is correct or not. If the guess is correct, the difference involves clear spikes. On the contrary, if the guess is incorrect, the difference tends to vanish or involves small spikes. Note that small spikes appear if the attacker correctly guesses some lower bits of W t . This is because the lower bits of TEMP2 are determined by those of W t and TEMP1, since TEMP2 = TEMP1+W t mod 2 l holds for l = 1, . . . , 32. Thus the attacker's task is to distinguish the size of the spikes.
Once the j-th bit of W t has been revealed, the attacker tries to reveal the next bit in the same way. He/she repeats this process, and reveals the secret key ∆. Note that he/she does not need to re-observe the power consumption, once he/she has gathered a sufficient number of power consumption samples for detecting the bit of W t , because the samples can be re-used. Thus his/her task for the next bit is to classify the samples into two categories based on the bit, and to calculate the average of each category.
We should note that the attacker may attempt to reveal several bits of W t simultaneously, instead of one single bit. Concretely speaking, when he/she attempts to reveal a consecutive bits of W t simultaneously, he/she classifies the inputs into two categories according to the Hamming weight of TEMP2 for each candidate of W t . Then for each candidate, he/she computes the difference of the average power consumption for the two categories. After that, he/she selects the sample with the biggest peak. The sample indicates the a secret bits of W t . Note that the sample with the second biggest peak corresponds to the candidate of W t which is closest to the correct W t under the Hamming distance. The use of such samples convinces the attacker of the correctness of his/her guess.
We have not intended to present that the proposed arithmetic operation based attack is better than the XOR ones. The goal of this paper is to show the first total experiment of the attack on SFLASH. Maybe the previous attacks or new attacks could be more effective than ours. In that case the security of SFLASH can be understood better, and there is no damage on the quality in our current paper.
The reason we chose the arithmetic operation attack is as follows: The original motivation of this research is to demonstrate the role of ∆. We have already shown that ∆ has two weak points; XOR and arithmetic operations. On one hand, there are some known approaches for XOR operation. On the other hand, although some countermeasures using arithmetic masks were proposed, no attacks on the arithmetic operations have been proposed so far, to the best of our knowledge. Thus, there are two things we have to show; experiment of the proposed SCA on ∆, and that of the attack against arithmetic operation. Hence, we choose the shortest path in order to achieve the first experiment of SCA on SFLASH.
Implementation of Patarin's Attack
In the following, we describe an implementation of Patarin's algebraic attack [16] , and estimate the number of signature/message pairs required for it. Let x 0,k , . . . , x 36,k be randomly chosen signatures, and denote by y 0,k , . . . , y 36,k their respective images, computed with the public Eq. (7). These pairs are the whole input and output to [G * ] −1 , and Patarin's cryptanalysis is applicable.
Patarins's attack consists of two parts, namely the construction of Eqs. (6) and an exhaustive search. Equation (6) are computed only once for a given SFLASH instance, and they give us candidates of forged signatures for any given message. Then an exhaustive search determines the proper signature, which corresponds to the inputted message.
Generation of Eq. (6):
At first, the attacker tries to find the coefficients γ j,k,l , δ j,l , j,l , η l of Eq. (6). These coefficients can be found by solving a linear system. There are at most 37 independent Eq. (6) [9] . In order to generate these 37 equations, the attacker deals with a 1407 × 1444 matrix in K, which consists of four submatrixes constructed with the gathered input-output pairs (x 0,k , . . . , x 36,k )-y 0,k , . . . , y 36,k :
• The first 1407 × 1407 submatrix is square; its coefficients are the cross-products x i,k y j,k .
• The dimensions of the second and the third submatrixes are 1407 × 37; their lines consist of the individual coefficients x i,k for the second and y i,k for the third submatrix.
• The last submatrix is the 1407-column-vector (1, . . . , 1).
The lines of the matrix have to be independent, so that its rank is exactly 1407 and the dimension of its kernel 37: in this case, the coefficients γ j,k,l , δ j,l , j,l and η l of the 37 Eq. (6) are vectors of the kernel of this matrix. We explain how to efficiently construct the matrix and its kernel in the following. We denote by line(k) the line constructed with the k-th input-output pair x 0,k , . . . , x 36,ky 0,k , . . . , y 36,k : first the 1407 cross-products x i,k y j,k , then the 37 x i,k , the 37 y j,k and finally 1. The matrix is recursively constructed by augmenting it with new lines which are not a linear combination of the other lines of the matrix. This can be achieved with the following algorithm: At the end of the procedure, the matrix has 1444 columns and 1407 lines, the coefficients are non-zeros on the diagonal and only zeros are to be found under the diagonal.
Next, we describe the computation of the kernel of the matrix. Given the matrix described above, the simplest method to compute its kernel is to carry on the gauss reduction and eliminate the unknowns on the right of the diagonal to obtain such a matrix: The columns of the matrix were possibly swapped as described in the matrix generation procedure, thus swapping the fields of these vectors in the inverse order provides a basis of the kernel. Finally, the fields of these vectors are the coefficients γ j,k,l , δ j,l , j,l , η l of the 37 Eq. (6).
Exhaustive search: We explain how to generate a signature for a given message (y 0 , . . . , y 36 ) using an exhaustive search. If the attacker substitutes the message to Eq. (6), he/she gets a linear system of 37 equations and 37 unknowns (x 0 , . . . , x 36 ):
where l = 0, . . . , 36. This system is equivalent to the equa- , which corresponds to the valid signature.
• if A is another solution, then A and A 0 differ from a factor which is a (128 11 − 1)-root of unity in L. Reciprocally, if A 0 is multiplied with a (128 11 − 1)-root of unity, we get another solution of the equation [9] .
There are 128 (128 11 − 1)-roots of unity in L. Therefore, the system (10) has also 128 solutions, which build an affine space of dimension 1, and the attacker has to search for a valid signature among them. Conceptually, finding these solutions is similar to finding Eq. (6), except that the dimension of the system is 37 instead of 1444: one has to find a particular solution X 0 of the system and a basis X 1 of the kernel of the matrix associated to the system. The solutions of the system are X = X 0 + λX 1 , where λ ∈ K and |K| = 128. This means that there are only 128 candidates. Besides, the valid signature verifies G * (X) = Y, where Y = (y 0 , . . . , y 36 ).
Dependence on the Signing Oracle
On the one hand, once an attacker knows both of ∆ and the public parameters of a SFLASH instance, the algebraic attack is able to forge a signature without any oracle calls, as we explained in Sect. 5.3. Therefore, the attacker is able to construct the dummy signature function totally off-linehe/she does not have to access the signing oracle. On the other hand, the side channel attack in Sect. 5.2 needs to observe the operation using the secret key ∆-the SCA has to access the signing oracle. The success of the SCA strongly depends on the architecture of the computational environment.
Experimental Results
In this section we describe the experimental results.
Side Channel Attack on ∆: We implemented SFLASH Signature with SHA-1 on an IC chip, and attempted to reveal ∆ using the proposed side channel attack. We observed 200,000 samples † of power consumption while the device performed SFLASH Signature. The experiments assumed the followings: The attacker aims to reveal the secret word W 6 that corresponds to a portion of ∆, and has already detected the lower sixteen bits of W 6 using the proposed attack. His/Her target is now the next four bits of W 6 .
First the attacker assumes that the target four bits are 0000, and classifies the inputs. That is, if the lower 20 (= 16 + 4) bits of TEMP2 have a Hamming weight larger than or equal to 13, the input belongs to the class C 13 . If the lower 20 bits of TEMP2 have a Hamming weight smaller than or equal to 7, the input belongs to the class C 7 † † . Then, the attacker computes the average power consumptions PC 13 and PC 7 of C 13 and C 7 using the observed 200,000 samples and the difference DI 0000 = PC 13 − PC 7 . In the same way, the attacker computes DI 0001 , DI 0010 , . . . , DI 1111 . In fact, every DI shows peaks, and DI 1111 has the largest peak. The uppermost curve of Fig. 2 shows DI 1111 , in which two peaks are clearly visible.
In order to show that DI 1111 has the largest peak, we computed the differences DI 0000 − DI 1111 , DI 0001 − DI 1111 , ..., and DI 1110 − DI 1111 . Fig. 2 shows these difference curves. The lowest curve indicates DI 0000 −DI 1111 , the second lowest curve indicates DI 0001 − DI 1111 , and so on. Each curve has depressions, which shows that DI 1111 has the largest peak. In addition, DI 1110 − DI 1111 , DI 1101 − DI 1111 , DI 1011 − DI 1111 , and DI 0111 − DI 1111 have the shallowest depressions. This implies that 1110, 1101, 1011, and 0111 are almost correct, that is, the difference from the correct four bits is just one bit. Thus, the four bits of W 6 are certainly 1111. In fact, this is the case.
The remaining bits of W 6 were detected in the same way. The attacker can detect other secret words W t using the observed samples. Therefore, the proposed side channel attack against ∆ certainly works.
Algebraic Attack on Signature Function:
We have implemented the algebraic attack described in Sect. 5.3. Our practical simulation confirms that 1410 message-signature pairs already allow to build Eq. (6) with a high probability, and 1408 pairs are needed on average. These results show that once ∆ is known, the recommended parameters of SFLASH make this cryptosytem particularly weak to Patarin's attack. Our implementation proves that the threat is not only theoretical but also practical, since the running time of Patarin's attack makes it feasible for an attacker to forge a signature in a relatively short time.
Countermeasures
A simple countermeasure prevent against the proposed attack is the use of "masking method" [12] . Since the proposed side channel attack targets at the arithmetic operation, the arithmetic masking should be utilized. Note that some switching methods are applicable to switch between arithmetic and boolean masking [2] , [7] . The use of such countermeasures protects against the proposed side channel attack on ∆, which implies that the algebraic attack on the signature function is also infeasible.
Conclusion
We showed a total experimental result about a side channel attack on SFLASH. The critical point of breaking SFLASH is the treatment of the secret key ∆. We demonstrated that if the implementation of SHA-1 is naive or careless, the attacker can recover ∆. The knowledge of ∆ reduces the security of the SFLASH to the C * problem, which was broken by † In order to show the clear difference in Fig. 2 , we observed the 200,000 samples. The use of fewer samples is enough to distinguish the difference. However, this fact may show both the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of the proposed attack in some practical situation.
† † Of course, (C 14 , C 6 ) for example is also acceptable. In our experiment, the use of (C 13 , C 7 ) provided the clearest result. This is the reason why we use these classes in this paper.
Patarin. From our simulation, about 1408 pairs of messages and their signatures can generate a dummy signature function in a few hours. Patarin's attack can be totally performed off-line, without asking the signing oracle. In order to resist the proposed attack, the developers of SFLASH should carefully implement SHA-1 related to ∆.
